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EAST TEXAS LABOR VIGNETTES

By: James C. Maroney
In my past life as a college professor, I often began lectures to introduce new topics with one or more readings in an attempt to create an
impressionistic "feel" for the time and place about to be studied. This
approach was an extension of my long-term appreciation of the works
of impressionist painters developed during my post-high school assignment in London as a member of the United States Air Force in the 1950s.
My wife-to-be and I spent many hours in British museums admiring
the work of the impressionists whose paintings revolutionized French
art with the use of light and color. One of the impressionists, Georges
Seurat, covered his canvasses with brilliant dots of pure color, a technique known as pointillism. It seemed natural then, that in college I was
drawn to the work of the imagist poets, who constructed "precise visual
images" in the minds of their reader.
Later, after I earned a B. A. degree and began the serious study of
history at the graduate-level, I became aware of the impressionistic organization described by Norman Cantor and Richard Schneider in How to
Study History, a writing style designed to create a series "descriptive pictures" employed so masterfully by Garrett Mattingly in The Armada and
by the Dutch scholar, Johan Huizinga in The Waning ofthe Middle Ages. I
By the I990s, I regularly had begun using readings in the classroom
to introduce new topics with a series of short, descriptive vignettes in my
freshman-level history classes, a technique that was directly influenced
by a monograph on the New Deal by Anthony J. Badger.
The book's first chapter, "Depression America," began with a series
of vivid passages. The first is reproduced here:
"This depression has got me licked" wrote a Houston mechanic in the fall
of 1930 before he committed suicide. "There is no work to be had. I can't
accept charity and I am too proud to appeal to my kin or friends, and I am
too honest to steal. So I see no other course. A landflowing with milk and
honey and afirst rate mechanic can't make an honest living. I would rather
take my chances with ajust God than with unjust humanity. "2

•••
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This article utilizes a series of vignettes of East Texas labor during the early decades of the twentieth century to recreate "images" of
the environment of working-class Texans. Such images, similar to those
created by the pointillism ofSeurat, are arranged in a seemingly random
order in an attempt to generate visual impressions in the reader's mind
that, hopefully, will produce a realistic "feel" for place and time.)

•••
In 1911, reporter George Waverly Briggs conducted a study of housing conditions in Texas cities, which revealed that Dallas, like other rapidly growing Texas industrial centers had an inadequate sewer system
that bore responsibility for various health problems, and that the city's
understaffed Board of Health was unable to cope with conditions tolerated by non-resident owners who consistently directed their local agents
to make no improvements. 4 In Galveston, Briggs discovered houses
pressed so close together in some sections of town that he speculated on
how carpenters working in such cramped quarters managed to nail up
walls! Although not yet common in the Bayou City, Briggs' investigation in Houston revealed a dozen or more "dark rooms" in downtown
boarding houses. These "dark rooms," common in New York City tenements, received their designation because their only light and ventilation
entered through an open door facing an interior hall, and the prevalent
overcrowding in these establishments made the dark rooms even more
sinister. Houston, like Dallas and other Texas cities, also coped with an
inadequate sewer system exacerbated by the over-crowding of workingclass homes and boarding houses. These conditions, in turn, helped to
create many weed-filled ditches and stagnant pools of water that became
breeding-grounds for mosquitoes. s

•••
An early success for the Texas working-class came with the passage of a child labor law during the 1903 session of the state legislature.
This act prohibited employment of children under twelve years of age
in mills and factories. At the same time the bill was under consideration
in the legislature, paid lobbyists for Texas mill operators energetically
campaigned against the measure, even while the operators loudly denied
that their mills employed more than a handful of children and publicly

80

EAST TEXAS LABOR VIGNETTES

professed support for the measure. Refusing to be misled and effectively
undercutting the mill operators' claims, the state's labor press published
documentation of the widespread employment of children under the age
of eight in Texas cotton mills. 6

•••
In the early years of the twentieth century, the Texas State Federation of Labor (TSFL) followed a conservative policy as proclaimed
in the 1904 and 1905 presidential addresses of Houstonian and TSFL
president Max Andrew, who indicated strong support for the capitalistic
system, maintaining that "labor unions are nothing [more than] the business organizations of the labor movement," and that organized labor and
capital must work together for the benefit of both. At least some business and professional men during these years responded positively to the
TSFL's conservative philosophy, offering their support for, and, on occasion, even expressing the desire to become part of the labor movement;
certainly, however, an attempt in 1903 by McLennan County physicians
to form a union and affiliate with the AFL represented a conspicuous
exception. AFL president Samuel Gompers rejected the application and
explained to field organizer R. C. Johnson that the request was denied
because AFL policy did not open membership to business and professional men, or to employers of labor. s

•••
By the end of 1910, TSFL-affiliated unions had weathered a nationwide open shop campaign during the first decade of the new century,
including a troublesome street railway strike in San Antonio and Houston, but overall craft unions had prospered at the local level; Fort Worth
labor leaders, for example, were able to boast that the AFL leadership
in Washington credited them with "having the largest per cent of skilled
workmen organized of any city in the United States."9 Moreover, Union
men regularly benefited from community support for their cause, as
demonstrated by a strike against Southwestern Bell in Fort Worth during
the summer of 1910, when a group of the city's pol icemen went on strike
themselves rather than guard "scab labor." One patrolman even volunteered that he joined the strike because he did not want his daughter, a
public school teacher in the city, to be humiliated by a father with a repu-
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tation as "a scab herder." The American Federationist, organ of the AFL,
optimistically reported that the strikers enjoyed "the sympathy of the
entire city," and that a group of businessmen had called a mass meeting
and agreed to boycott the use of telephones during the strike.!O [t should
be pointed out, however, that any union success boasted by the TSFL
ignored the fact that the elitist approach of limiting their representation
[for the most part] to skilled craft unions overlooked the difficult and
sometimes desperate conditions faced by the unskilled and unorganized
who made up the vast majority of the working-class.

•••
The involvement and contributions of upper- and middle-class "clubwomen" during the progressive movement is well-known,!! but recent
scholars of labor and working-class history have documented evidence
demonstrating important and even vital contributions by their workingclass sisters.'2 Eva Goldsmith of Houston, state president of the United
Garment Workers' Union, became the chief spokesperson for the TSFL's
lobbying efforts in its fight for a reduction of hours for women factory workers. Goldsmith, like other women progressives, also fought for
various feminist causes, including the battle for woman suffrage. Such
legislative activism, as noted by historian Judith N. McArthur, "enabled
working-class women to assume a public role" previously occupied by
[upper- and] middle-class women. 13
In January, 1913, Goldsmith made a dramatic appearance before
a committee of the house of representatives to testify on behalf of the
Lane-Wortham bill that proposed to limit the work of women to fiftyfour hours per week, with a maximum of ten hours per day. According
to T. C. Jennings, chair of the TSFL's legislative committee, the moving account of "this noble little working girl" so powerfully portrayed
the plight of working mothers required to toil twelve or more hours per
day, that she brought tears to the eyes of several of the committee's
members, and that [at least] some corporate lobbyists fled [in defeat]
before Goldsmith completed her presentation.!4 In an attempt to counter Goldsmith's impassioned testimony, mill owner J. C. Saunders of
Bonham, representing management's position, submitted a petition from
his employees opposing the bill on the grounds that they could not afford to work fewer hours for lower pay. Saunders, of course, denied the
use of coercion to force support for the petition and argued that Texas
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mill workers already earned twenty-five percent more than mill workers in the other southern states with whom his mills competed. Despite
Goldsmith's powerful testimony, the continuing power of employers and
their lobbyists to influence legislation remained all too obvious when
the legislature subsequently enacted the fifty-four hour Jaw in a watereddown form. 15 The limited gains of labor and their friends, therefore,
represented nothing more than a Pyrrhic victory since enforcement of
the bill remained inconsistent due to insufficient funds appropriated for
enforcement, which was typical of much progressive era legislation at
both state and national levels.
Two years later, Goldsmith, the first female member of the TSFL's
legislative committee, reported to the TSFL's annual meeting on labor's
lobbying efforts l6 on behalf of a proposed minimum wage bill, detailing
its uphill and only partially successful battle against corporate interests
in an attempt to improve the fifty-four hour law. Testimony by Goldsmith
and others before the legislature overcame the cynical opposition of lobbyist and former Senator Q. U. Watson who, after impatiently listening
to testimony given by a group of Austin "Club Women" on behalf of a
minimum wage bill, sarcastically wondered if, in addition to applying to
working-women, the measure also included a provision to provide for
"GOATS." Upon finding that he could not intimidate the women, Watson
scolded them with a tongue-lashing, claiming that they "had too much
religion," and that their place was "at home and not in the Capitol trying
to pass sentimental legislation." In her report, Goldsmith commended
the "good women of Austin" for their courage and willingness to "stand
up for the rights of the womanhood of Texas" and to endure "the insults
and criticism" of mill owners, lobbyists, and their allies. A somewhat improved fifty-four hour law did finally pass, although the minimum wage
proposal never reached the floor of either the house or senate. Nonetheless, by 1917 the Houston Labor Journal optimistically reported that
members of the Texas garment workers' union "are among the best paid
... female wage earners ..." and claimed that the union's efforts had
virtually eliminated competition from convict-made goods, and successfully had reduced the demand for non-union made garmentsY
In a fascinating footnote to her report, Goldsmith gave an account
of the $100.00 appropriated by the previous TSFL annual meeting for
her use to continue the fight to amend the fifty-four hour law. She indicated that her expenditures included $7.50 for printing, $12.00 for "railroad and car fare," $44.00 for room and board, $7.00 for stamps, special
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delivery, telegrams, and one long-distance telephone call. Furthermore,
she refunded the remaining $29.50 of the $100.00 appropriation, which,
from the perspective of the early twenty-first century, makes one long
for a simpler time. ls [According to the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Inflation Calculator, $100.00 in 1915 would amount to $2,244.21
in 2012.]19

•••
In the fall of 1913, the National Child Labor Committee conducted
an investigation in which the noted sociologist and photographer Lewis
W. Hine, documented numerous violations of the state's child labor statute in cotton mills, in department stores, and in factories manufacturing a variety of items such as brooms, mattresses, candy, and handles
for tools. Hine and his colleagues found that young boys working for
news and messenger services frequently were assigned to carry messages, packages, and drugs to houses of prostitution, a practice especially condemned by the Committee's investigators. 2o In an example cited
by Hine, fourteen year-old Charlie Price, who worked as a runner for
the White Wing Messenger Service in Fort Worth, recommended a fivedollar house to Hine, if he were so inclined, in order to avoid catching
"a disease" at other, presumably less expensive, establishments. Hine's
report to the Committee did not indicate whether he acted upon Price's
advice or not. 21

•••
In October, 1914, Committee on Industrial Relations investigator
Peter A. Speek found high unemployment in Houston during the course
of his investigation when he interviewed working-class residents. His
report listed "real down-and-outs," long-time immigrants, and citizens
who wintered in cities in eastern Texas after "freighting" in from midwestern cities like Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City. Sometimes called
"birds of passage," these temporary residents begged, sought charity,
and on occasion competed with blacks for odd jobs, before their springtime return north. Speek labeled another group "home-seekers," lured to
Texas by unscrupulous real estate and land developers who sometimes
were assisted by business interests. The "home-seekers" frequently lost
several thousand dollars before falling prey to "eager loan sharks." Usu-
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ally comprised of native-born citizens and long-time immigrants most
of whom came from central and southern Europe, these home-seekers
often remained in Houston and became casual laborers. Ordinary common laborers, according to Speek, made up the largest group of the unemployed. About half were Mexican, Mexican American, or African
American, who consistently were unsuccessful in applying for charity,
but competed for odd jobs, and according to Speek, refused to beg, although they sometimes stole food from residential areas in well-to-do
suburbs. 22

•••
Houstonians interviewed by Speek included Socialist Party members Ira Tucker, E. C. Kuester, and several socialist sympathizers, including E. B. Hadstall, business agent for the Houston Building Trades
Council and county commission candidate for the Socialist Party. While
all of these men confirmed that the state's AFL labor lobby had been
instrumental in securing passage of labor-friendly legislation, they were
quick to point out that the effectiveness of these measures often was
minimal due to the lack of personnel with authority to enforce the legislation. 23

•••
In 1911 the Houston Labor Council claimed that the city's labor
force [in rounded-off numbers] consisted of approximately 25,000 workers, of whom 15,000 were male, 6,000 were women, and some 4,000
were children under the age of fifteen. The Labor Council boasted that
fifty-five percent of the men were organized, but only two percent of
women, all of whom belonged to the Garment Workers local. Some
eighty-five percent of the skilled trades were unionized, and numerous
locals, including printers and printing pressmen, brewery workers, coopers, plumbers, marble workers, and structural iron workers, were one
hundred percent organized. All of these craft workers enjoyed reasonably good pay and steady work, although some work was seasonal; on
the other hand, about ninety percent of common laborers remained unorganized, and some twenty-five percent of the unorganized consistently
failed to find regular employment,24
The creation of the U. S. Conciliation Service in 1913 during the
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presidency of Woodrow Wilson resulted in close ties between the national government and the American labor establishment, especially during
World War I. After local disputes in Texas involving streetcar workers
in Waco and conflict between union workers and shipbuilding contractors in Orange, Beaumont, and Houston failed, the disagreements were
referred to the Conciliation Service, which helped achieve satisfactory
settlements. 25 The promise of a new era of labor-management accommodation offered by successful conciliation in these instances proved
illusory, however, when labor confronted the united opposition of oil
producers during the Texas-Louisiana oil field strike of 1917-1918. 26

•••
Rising costs of living, poor working conditions, and paternalistic
company policies prompted Goose Creek oil field workers, aided by
the state federation and the Houston Trades Council, to form a local in
December, 1916. By the following spring, oil field workers throughout
the Texas-Louisiana gulf coast area had established locals that affi liated
directly with the American Federation of Labor since no national union
for oil workers existed. 27 When the gulf coast locals invited producers
to meet with them in Houston to discuss worker grievances on 15 October 1917, the producers refused, and sent letters to their employees. 28
Representative of the employer stance, Ross S. Sterling, president of
the Humble Oil & Refining Company, wrote in part: "We see no reason
why we should confer with outsiders or strangers upon matters which
concern our employees and ourselves."29 These employer declarations,
ignoring strong worker sentiment in favor of the democratic principle of
self-determination [as opposed to management's top-down control], fed
worker anger and prompted the union to issue a set of demands and call
a strike vote in which some 5,992 oil field workers, representing 97% of
those participating, voted in the affirmative. Worker discontent spread,
and on I November 1917, approximately 10,000 men in some seventeen
oil fields in Texas and Louisiana walked out. 30
With U. S. commissioners of conciliation and agents of the newly
formed President's Mediation Service unable to effect a settlement, oil
producers floated rumors of the possible involvement of the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) and German spies. 31 Such blatant propaganda disseminated by the producers found a sympathetic ear in the person of Texas governor William P. Hobby, who requested that the army
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send troops into the oil fields to guard company property from the IWW
and enemy agents. 32 While some evidence exists to indicate that the
army initially maintained an impartial stance,33 the very presence of government troops could not help but influence public opinion by lending
credence to employer claims of subversive influence within the ranks of
the strikers. Despite the creation of the International Association of Oil
Field, Gas Well and Refinery Workers ofAmerica (OFGWRWU) in June,
1918, division in the ranks of the union men, which included failure of
the unskilled oil field roughnecks to win support of refinery workers,
many of whom were skilled craft unionists, in stark contrast to employer
unity, doomed the strike. The final settlement represented a near total
victory for the producers and killed union effectiveness. Approximately
one-fourth of the strikers lost their jobs as a result of the strike, including
R. E. Evans, president of the Goose Creek local and one of the union's
guiding lights. Reacting with an apparent paranoid fear of the unionization of their employees, which potentially could lead to loss of their
top-down control, Gulf and Humble granted wage increases equivalent
to union demands within two months of the settlement. Furthermore,
several of the oil companies soon inaugurated housing programs and
stock-purchasing plans for employees, all of which thoroughly undermined any effective demand for unionism. 34
While the new oil workers' international union grew rapidly for a
time, the combined effects of the failure to attract refinery workers, craft
union hostility, jurisdictional conflicts among workers, employer initiated benefits, and a new open shop movement at the end of World War
I, all contributed to a near total decline of the OFGWRWU until its reincarnation during the New DeaJ.35

•••
In still another setback for Texas workers, the Houston Labor Council in 1927 refused the application of African American locals for affiliation with the explanation that "under the present and prevailing conditions
it would not only be impractical, but almost impossible to
admit
delegates from the colored unions." Houston African American longshoreman and TSFL annual meeting delegate John North criticized such shortsighted thinking, citing the need for black organizers,
and declared that while black waterfront workers wanted to be loyal to
the white man's union movement, he non-too subtly warned that if the
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white labor establishment ignored the black man, employers were likely
to organize a non-union workforce composed of African Americans in
Gulfports, where black and white locals had shared work for many years
on a fifty-fifty basis. J6
In conclusion, the unprecedented degree of prosperity and acceptance won by AFL and the railroad brotherhoods during the World War
I proved to be only temporary, and resulted, not from any sense of employer benevolence, but from the demands of the wartime emergency,
and did not conceal lessons inherent in the wartime experiences of these
unionized workers: in the short run, loosely organized union men, who
often squabbled with colleagues over jurisdictional matters, provided no
effective opposition to organized and determined employers. Even more
ominous for the future of organized labor, however, was the labor establishment's failure to recognize the futility of its conservative strategy.
For the most part, labor leaders in state and nation, composed almost
entirely of the representatives of craft unions and railroad brotherhoods,
represented an elite cadre whose leadership gradually had evolved from
a position of support for those with ties to the Knights of Labor and
Popul ist traditions of the nineteenth century, to a new strategy that supported business-oriented leaders amenable to the conservative-Samuel
Gompers-AFL brand of unionism. In what proved to be an ill-fated
long-range strategy for the future of the working-class, these new leaders
adamantly opposed any move toward industrial unionism. 37 While they
occasionally paid lip service to, they for the most part ignored, the plight
of the unskilled and the unorganized who composed the vast majority
of the American work force. The wartime gains enjoyed by the labor
establishment soon clashed with a new open shop movement bred amidst
the hysteria of the Red Scare and enflamed by national labor troubles in
1919, which led to drastic retrenchment of organized labor in both Texas
and the nation during the 1920s.
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